Fairhope High School - Mr. Tim Yahr
Fairhope High School - Mr. Tim Yahr

FRIDAY 12/6/19

5th period - Last Junior Achievement "Be Entrepreneurial" lesson.

 

2nd & 3rd periods - Investigating the world of law by means of the information below.  You can read LOTS of cases from the US Supreme Court and each State's Supreme Court at CASELAW.FINDLAW.com.  So...should Mr. Casey get a new trial or have his original conviction overturned or should the original conviction be affirmed?

 

Absent 5th - See Mr. Yahr to turn in your JA workbook and receive the last assignment.

Absent 2nd or 3rd - do the assignment below.

 

1. READ THE FOLLOWING. 

A.  DEFINE “INTENTIONALLY”.

B.  DEFINE “KNOWINGLY”

C.  WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY?

D.  COMPLETE THE SENTENCE – “HE ENGAGES IN CONDUCT CONSTITUTING …”

E.  ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH ¶15(2) DOES ATTEMPT REQUIRE INTENT OR KNOWING OR BOTH?

A. The Elements of Attempted Murder

   ¶13 Attempt crimes are derivatives of completed crimes, and the express language of both the completed crime statute and the attempt statute determines the elements of the attempt crime. Thus, a conviction for attempted murder must satisfy the elements of the murder statute, with the obvious exception that the murder need not be completed, and the attempt statute.

   ¶14 The murder statute at issue in this case allows for a conviction if a person "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a). Both "intentionally" and "knowingly" are defined by statute. One acts intentionally "when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Id. § 76-2-103(1) (1999). On the other hand, one acts knowingly "when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances" and "aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. § 76-2-103(2). A defendant can be convicted of murder under either level of culpability.

   ¶15 To be convicted of attempted murder, however, additional and different elements must be shown under the attempt statute. The attempt statute states as follows:

(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense.

(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.

Id. § 76-4-101. Thus, to be convicted of attempted murder, a defendant's actions must constitute a substantial step toward causing the death of another, and the substantial step must indicate his or her intent to commit the crime. In this case, Casey argues that the substantial step must indicate the intent to kill. Indeed, some authorities have noted that "[a]lthough murder may be committed without an intent to kill, an attempt to commit murder requires a specific intent to kill." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 695, at 591-97 (15th ed. 1996). We must now decide whether a conviction for attempted murder in Utah requires a higher level of culpability than that required for murder.

 

2.  READ THE FOLLOWING.

A.  WHAT WAS MR. CASEY TRIED AND CONVICTED OF?

B.  WHY IS MR. CASEY ASKING FOR AN APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION? (KEEP IT TO 1 SENTENCE OR LESS).

 

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

   ¶1 This case concerns the mens rea that must be shown to convict a defendant of attempted murder. Specifically, we consider whether a conviction for attempted murder may rest upon a knowing mental state rather than an intentional mental state. Michael Shawn Casey was tried and convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and domestic violence in the presence of a child. He moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions improperly stated that he could be convicted of attempted murder for acting knowingly or intentionally. He appealed from the denial of this motion. The court of appeals affirmed Casey's conviction, relying on two of our prior opinions addressing similar jury instructions for attempted murder. Casey then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to this court. We hold that a conviction for attempted murder must rest on a finding that the defendant acted intentionally. Thus, the trial court improperly instructed the jury. Nevertheless, because the instructions in this case did not rise to the level of plain error or manifest injustice, we affirm.

3.  READ THE FOLLOWING:

A.  NAME THREE THINGS THAT COULD HAVE KEPT MR. CASEY FROM ATTEMPTING MURDER OF MS. FRANZ.

B.  NAME 1 THING OTHER PEOPLE COULD HAVE DONE (THAT THEY DIDN'T DO) TO HELP KEEP MR. CASEY FROM ATTEMPTING MURDER.

            1.  MS. FRANZ

            2.  MR. ALLRED

            3.  MS. RIBE

C.  DO YOU THINK MR. CASEY SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER BASED ON “KNOWINGLY”?

D.  DO YOU THINK MR. CASEY SHOLD BE CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER BASED ON “INTENTIONALLY”?

BACKGROUND

   ¶2 "We recite the facts from the record . . . in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted); accord State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Utah 1994). In early 1999, Casey was involved in a relationship with Tresa Franz. On April 12, 1999, Casey and his friend, Terron Allred, met Franz at her home, where the three consumed some alcohol. Casey then drove Franz, Franz's four-year-old son, and Allred to tow Franz's truck to a friend's house. After dropping off the truck, Casey stopped at a liquor store where Franz purchased a bottle of rum. Though Franz and Allred had "a swig" of the rum, Casey consumed most of the bottle. Intoxicated, Casey became belligerent, and he and Franz began arguing. When Franz asked Casey to take her home, Casey refused, laughing at her and threatening to kill her.

   ¶3 Following this threat, Casey drove over to Tiffany Ribe's house, located in Salt Lake City. Once there, Casey got out of the vehicle and spoke with Ribe and others while Allred, Franz, and her child remained in the vehicle. When Casey returned to the vehicle, Allred got out to speak with Ribe, and Casey and Franz began arguing again. As Casey entered the driver's side of the vehicle, he reached behind the seat and grabbed a handgun from a camera bag. During the argument, Franz asked Casey if he was ready to go home. Casey responded inappropriately and pointed the gun at Franz's neck.

   ¶4 Observing Casey pointing the weapon at Franz, Ribe went over to the vehicle and told Casey to leave. Casey lowered the gun, apologized to Ribe, and agreed to leave. As Allred was getting back in the vehicle, Franz fled into Ribe's house for a few minutes. Franz returned to the vehicle, however, when she realized that her son was still in the back seat.

   ¶5 With Franz and Allred back in the vehicle, Casey began to pull out of Ribe's driveway. Casey and Franz began arguing again, and just after they pulled out of the driveway, Casey pointed the handgun at Franz's head. He pulled the trigger, but the handgun misfired; both Franz and Allred testified that they heard the click of the hammer when Casey pulled the trigger.(1) Casey then pointed the gun at Franz's feet and successfully fired a round, which lodged in the floor of the vehicle. Once again, Casey pointed the gun at Franz's head. This time, Franz grabbed Casey's arm, pushed it away, and jumped out of the moving vehicle. As Franz jumped, Casey fired one more time. In total, Casey fired two shots from the gun in addition to the one misfire.

4.  READ THE FOLLOWING.

A.  WHAT DID THE COURT DECIDE CONCERNING KNOWINGLY VS. INTENTIONALLY?  CAN A PERSON BE CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER ON KNOWINGLY ONLY?

B.  COMPLETE THE SENTENCE ”WOULD RESULT IN REVERSAL …”

C.  COMPLETE THE SENTENCE “THE ERROR WAS NOT OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO AFFECT CASEY’S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BECAUSE …”

CONCLUSION

   ¶51 We hold that in order to convict a defendant of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish that the defendant acted intentionally; it is not enough that he or she acted knowingly. However, we do not believe this holding significantly impacts Casey's conviction. Since Casey did not object to the jury instructions prior to his convictions, any error committed by the trial court when it instructed the jury would result in reversal only if such error constituted manifest injustice or plain error. Because of the confusion created by our footnote in Vigil, which interpreted our holding in Maestas to allow attempted murder convictions based on intentional or knowing conduct, we hold that the error in the jury instructions was not plain, manifest, or obvious. In addition, we hold that the error was not of sufficient magnitude to affect Casey's substantial rights because no reasonable jury could have concluded that he acted knowingly without also concluding that he acted intentionally. For these reasons we conclude that no manifest injustice or plain error resulted from the use of the jury instructions in this case. Accordingly, we affirm.

Here's where you can enter in text. Feel free to edit, move, delete or add a different page element.

 

 

MIDTERM EXAMS --->

December 16th and 17th  electives will test.

December 18th  core classes will test in periods 1, 3, 5, and 7

December 19th  core classes will test in periods 2, 4, 6

December 20th  Make-up Exams:  Students who do not have a make-up exam will be excused if they bring in a parent note requesting they be excused for that Friday.

Click here to follow the directions to access student grades and other information.

Note:  You must log in twice each time you access information.

1st log in -- username   homeuser

                 password    homeuser1

2nd log in -- 

username and password that is provided on your student's INow Home Portal Login Slip - contact the school office in person for your username and password.

Click here to sign up for NOTIFY ME.

Print Print | Sitemap
© Timothy Yahr